Bounds on Key Equivocation for Simple Substitution Ciphers
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Abstract-The equlvocatloo or the key ror a simple substitution cipbcr is upper and lower bounded, wben the message source is memoryless. lbe bounds are sbown to be expooentlally tight. lbe results are compared with randoro cipbering. lt is observed that tbe exponentlsJ bebavior or tbe equivocatlon or the key is DO( determioed by tbe redundancy in tbe message source, but by tbc symbol probabilities wbicb are dosest in a certain sense.
l. lNTRODUCTION C IPHERS are used to limit the ability of a wiretapper to discover the content of a n intercepted message. In ( l] Shannon laid down the theoretical framework for analysis of such a situation a nd introduced a theory of secrecy systems. A secrecy system is defined as a family of uniquely reversible transformations :T = { ~( ·) }~ of a set of possible messages 0TL = { mn }~ in to a set of cryptograms ~~ = {en) ·· . the transformations ha ving associated probabilities { p 1 )~-A block diagram depicting the behavior of a secrecy system is shown in Fig. l . The message source symbols a re transformed by the encipherer into cryptogram symbols before they are Iransmitted over the channel. To recover the message at the receiving end the inverse transformation is performed by the decipherer. The transformation and inverse transformation used are specified by the outcome of the key source.
When evaluating the strength of a secrecy system, it is assume.i that the wiretapper knows the set of transformations :1 and the statistics of the message and the key sources. Given this information, but not the actual key, the wiretapper tries to estimate the message and / or the key from an intercepted cryptogram. Under these circumstances it is shown in (1 , pp. 667-668] that the conditional entropies of the key and of the message given the cryptogram can be used as measures of the strength of the system. The conditional entropies are called the equivocation of the key and of the message, respectively .
In general it is hard to explicitly calculate these equivocations. Therefore, Shannon (l] analyzed their properties. In [l , p. 698] i t is proposed that complex "practical" ciphers behave approximately as randoro ciphers. On the other hand, it is stated in [2] that randoro ciphers perform much more poorly than carefully designed ciphers. In this paper we derive an upper bound on the key equivocation for simple substitution ciphers that is exponentially tight. This bound together with calculations of the equivocation are compared with the equivocation of a corresponding randoro cipher.
In Section II we formally state the problem and give the necessary background. Section III contains the derivation of expressions on the equivocation of the key that are used in Section IV to obtain upper and lower bounds . . Jn Section V the results are discussed and compared with random ciphers.
Il. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PRELIMINARlES
Refer to Fig. l . The message source is discrete and memoryless with alphabet ')1(., = {l, 2, 3, · · · , N}. The probabiii ty of a symbol n is PM(n) = qn. The cryptogram alphabet 0 is taken to be the same as c:m... The set of transformations 5" = { ~( ·) }~ is the set of all invertible transformations of ~ on to &; . Thus the number of elements in 5" is J= N!. The key and the message sources are independent, and the keys are equiprobable, i.e., P K(j) =l / N!.
We will refer to the cipher defined by 5 above as a simple substitution cipher. We note that 5" is a group of transformations and that the transformations could be seen as permutations of the message alphabeL 0018-9448/ 79/ 0100-0008$00.75 ©1979 IEEE
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Now a word about notation. Let ~ be an arbitrary finite set. A sequence of length L o f symbols in ~ will be written as (l) where subscripted letters deno te the components and superscripted boldface letters denote sequences. The ensemble of all sequences of length L is written ~L. A similar convention applies to random sequences and variables which are denoted by uppercase letters.
A transformation of a message symbol m E 0ll will be written as (2) and we will use the same notation for transformations of a sequence of message symbols
which should not ca use any confusion. We also define r 1 ( · )E~~ to be the identity transformation. The notation · of sta ndard information quantities are as defined by Gallager [3] , and the wiretapper's equivocation of the key is written H(K IE L). The Jogarithms involved in this paper are taken to the base e. Hence entropies and equivocations will be expressed in nats/symbol.
The main object of this paper is to find exponentially tight bounds on the equivocation of the key. However, before doing that we first derive a generallower bound on H(K jEL) without using the assumption that the message source is memoryless. Then we make an observation about the general behavior of H ( KIEL) when the message source is memoryless.
The lower bound can be obtained by writing 9 The fundamental nature of this lower bound leads us to state this result as a theorem.
Theorem J: If the key and message sources are independent, the key equivocation of a secrecy system is lower bounded by (9).
When the message source is memoryless, (9) can be written as
We observe that (10) is equal to the approximate expression for the key equivocation of a random cipher [l , pp. 
691-693] when
U is called the unicity distance. The interpretation is that after the interception of U symbols. it is almost always possible to get a unique solution to a random cipher. We see that up to the point when the random cipher becomes uniquely solvable, the key equivocation of the cipher behaves as the general lower bound in (JO). Thus the above is a simpler and more general derivation of Hellman's result [2] that a random cipher is essentially the worst possible. From the properties of conditional entropy, it is evident that H(KIEL) is monotonically decreasing with L. When the message source is memoryless, the equivocation of the key is also convex in the sense that
and using rhe equalities (4) To see this, subtract the right side of (12) from the left side, and subslitute (6). Then we get
The first equality in (S) is due to the fact that knowing K and EL is equivalent to knowing K and ML, because all
The seeond equality follows from the independence of the message and key sources. Combining ( 4) and (5) gives The inequality in (13) is due to the reduction of the number of variables upon which the conditioning is made (7) in the seeond term. The last expression is zero because of the stationarity of the process.
Combining (6), (7), and (8) In this section we derive an exact expression for H(KIEL) in terms of the message symbol probabilities. (9) This expression is used to calculate exact values of the key equivocation to which the bounds can be compared. It is a lso used as a starting point in the derivation of an upper bound of H(K IE L) when the message source is binary.
To o btain the desired expression for H(KIEL), we write
and {16)
because tk is deterministic and invertible. Hence (15) can be written as We also observe that the following equalities a re true:
To see this, note that the summation is done over all permutations of the indices of either the exponents or the exponentiated facto rs. The sum over all cryptograms in (i, L in ( 14) can now be expressed as a sum over all frequency vectors y for which
Hence, after substitution of (19) into (14), the equalities in
IV. UPPER AND LowER BoVNos
To obtain the upper bound we have to prove three inequalities related to entropy functions. We state these inequalities in a general setting in the three lemmas below.
For proofs see Appendix A.
Lemma 1:
In the third lemma we improve the bound of (24) for the special c ase J 1 = 2, for all i. As a corollary to Lemma 3. we state a simple upper hound w the entropy of a binary source (f= 1). Fig. 2 is a plot of this bound . Corol!ary J: If a bi nary source has P(!) = p and P(O)= l -p. we have
Lemma 3:
(26} lt is now possible to derive an upper bound on the equivocation of the key. The bound is given in the following theo rem.
Theorem 2: If a discrete memoryless source is enciphered by a simple substitution cipher with equiprobable keys and the source alphabet has N letters with probabilities {q;}~, we have a)
(28} Proof a) Applying Lemma 2 to (14) gives
Using the notation of Section III, substituting (19) into (29), and using an equality similar to (20), we have
because the summation over l is over all permutations of the indices. The right side of (3 1) is independent of k. Thus substitution of (3 1) in (30) and summation over k give the upper bound in (27). b) W hen N= 2, (22) r educes to
where [ L / 2] is the targest integer less than or equal to
lt is now easy to apply Lemma 3 to (32), which gives
is a subgroup of the group genera ted by the elements of we can write (27) as
Cauch y's inequality shows that a 1 < l, l= 1,2, ·· · ,N !, be-
A necessary and sufficient condition for equality in (37) is t ha t n=1,2, · · · ,N .
When all q n are distinct, (38) is true on ly for l= l , and the bound will go to zero when L goes to infinity. We also observe that the set 5 1 of transformations
From the definitions of '5 1 and '5 2 , i t is obvious that a 1 < l when l E e 3 , and consequently (45) shows that the limit of the upper bound is log (d) when L goes to infinity.
We can also show that H(K IEL) ~log (d). To see this use (22) to write
Then (45) and (46) show that both the upper bound in (27) and H (KIEL) have the same limiting value when L goes to infinity. From (36) it is obvious that the bound has the correct value log (N!) at L= O. 
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Nats Symb messag:e source and the un icity distance. q 1 ,q 2 • • • • are the symbol probabilities of the mes~age source. lt is possible to show that the hounds in Theorem 2 are ex.ponentially tight. To do this we start by finding a new lower bo und for the c ase N= 2 a n d L even.
Theorem 3:
If a binary memoryless source is enciphered by a simple substitution cipher with equiprobab1e keys and the symbol probabilities of the message source are q 1 , q 2 , we have
for L=2.4,6,···.
(47)
Prooj: We start with the expression (32) for the equivoca tion used in the proof of Theorem 2:
As a lo we r bo und we tak e the tenn for x= L / 2 in ( 49) (50) Finally by evaluation of (54) for L=O. we obtain , {2 4 H(K)=log(2) > y; 9 1og(2).
Hence we have proved the following corollary:
Coro//ary 2: If a binary memoryless source is enciphered by a simple substitution cipher with equiprobab1e keys and the symbol probabilities of the message source are q 1 ,q 2 , we have Now we show that (27) in Theorem 2 which applies for N > 2 is exponentially tight. To reach our goal we start by simplifying the upper bound as it is stated in (45) by using the standard inequality log (l+ x) o;;; x:
(59)
Lower bounding the binomial coefficient in (50) by Stir-To determine t 1 ( • ), we write ling's fe rmula gives
(51) Substitution of (51) in to (50) and identification of terms proves the theorem.
D
Comparing (28) in Theorem 2 and (47) makesit obvious that we have exponentially tight bounds on the equivocation when N= 2. Fig. 4 shows the bounds for t wo different ca ses.
To get a lower bound that holds for a ll va!ues of L , we observe that
Then when L > l,
and let i= v and j= JL be the indices for which bij has its !east value greater then zero. We also observe that if (62) for a particular value of n , then there must exist another value of n for which (62) is true. Furthermore, because b, 1 = b 1 ;, a transformation yielding the maximum a 1 would betong to the coset genera t ed by
Hence we may assume that / 0 gives the transformatio n specified by (63). Using the form of H(KIEL) given by the first equality of (46) as a starting point. we get the following lower Nats Symb Nats Symb L!
To get the last expression we used the description of 1 10 ( ·) in (63). Now (64) can be brought into a fo rm that makes it possible to apply the inequality in Corollary 2. To do this, define
(67)
Substitution of (65)- (68) in (64) and application of C orollary 2 gives Vc·--
Equations (58) and (70) show the exponential behavior of the bo und.
V. 0ISCUSSION
As is seen in Figs. 3 and 4 . the general behavior of the upper bounds in (27) and (28) are quite similar to the exact H(K IEL). For small values of N , (27) can easily be evaluated by a computer. The time to compute the bound in Fig. 3 is negligible while the exact computation of H(KIEL) took about 12 hours on an Eclipse computer. With increasing N the bound grows less attractive to evaluate, because i t in volves the sum of N! terms exponentiated to L. However, if one allows a degradation of the bound, this difficulty can be circumvented by upper bounding the sum inside the logarithm. One way to this is shown in Appendix B.
From the derivation of the exponential behavior of the bounds, it becomes evident that the exponential behavior of H(K IEL) is detemuned by the symbol prohabibties t ha t are most equal, in the sense that l\!'(/; -'lfi l > O is as small as possible. This stands in sharp contrast to the exponential behavior of a random cipher which is determined by the redundancy in the message source [l , p p. 691 -693] . According to (l O) the behavior of the equivocation of a random cipher for small L is also determined by the redundancy. Fig. 5 shows the equivocation of two sources with approximately the same entropy. From the figure it is seen that the equivocations behave differently, and so do the bounds.
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APPENDIX A
Prooj oj Lemma l
The proof depends o n a n inequali t)' betwcen the: a ri thmetic and geometric mea ns. 
Proof of Lemma 2
To obtain (24) we rewrite its left side a nd use Lemrna l:
Pi;
• -1 j-1 p, Pi;
The logarithm is a convex function, and so (73) can be upperboundcd by
D
Proof of Lemma 3
Le t y, = V p 11 / p, 2 . Substitution in to the left side of (25) gives the following inequality:
•-l lt is now sufficient to prove that f( y;)= ..!._ log (l +yl)+ Y; log (l + J,) . ; ; ; 2 log 2 
Thus the derivative is positive, f(O)=O, f(l)=2 log (2), which proves (76).
D APPENDIX B
Let z represent the sum inside the logarithm of (36):
/ =2
We wish to fin d an upper bound on z that is reasonable to calculate when N is large. The technique we use is to divide the set of all a 1 into groups and to represent all a 1 in a group by the max1mum value of the group. For si mplicity let us assume that all qn are distinct and that qn > qn+ 1 • To avoid notationa l trouhles we will only explicitly describe the case when the division is into N groups. Generalizing this procedure to other numbers of groups should be immediate.
Let us define the partitioning by N sets ei; of indices of/. For a fixed i E (1 , 2, · ··,N), let e"= {l!r,(i) =J ), J= 1, 2, ... ,N .
(80)
The number of elements in each ei; is (N-l)! To fi nd the maximum of a 1 when l E Lij, we write
n -l
n-•
We observe that the sum in (8 1) is over the pairwise product of elements from two sequences { v'q,; }~-1 and{~ r~-1 '
respectively. The elements in the first sequence decrease with N while the elements in the seeond sequence could be arbitrarily ordered. However, in t ij there ex.ists one l for every possible ordering. We now use the fact tha t the maximum of a sum such as the on e in (8 1) is reached w hen both sequences are similarily ordered. that is when both sequences are either increasing or decreasing (4, p. 262). Thus tbere is an effective algorithm for calculating a 1 = max (a 1 ).
' / Et.,
lt on ly re ma ins to tak e care of the set of a 1 defined by e;,.
Because of the assumption that all qn a re distinct, it is only for l = l t hat a 1 = l w hen l E f:;;· We can upper bo und all other a 1 in this group with a 10 and write an upper bound of z as
n-l
Let us point out that the tightness of the bound depends on the choice of i in the definition of t lj . This is because the maximum in each group of a 1 depends on the probabilities qn.
To make the bound better. the groups tu could themselves be further divided. The way to do this is to use the same technique as we used a bove and introduce subgroups such as the one defined by (84)
If this process of dividing exis ting groups continues, the eventual result will be z. How far to go in this process of dividing in to subgroups must be decided by how many terms one can afford in the computation of the bound .
